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What makes one person more intellectually able
than another? Can the entire distribution of human
intelligence be accounted for by just one general
factor? Is intelligence supported by a single neural
system? Here, we provide a perspective on human
intelligence that takes into account how general
abilities or ‘‘factors’’ reflect the functional organiza-
tion of the brain. By comparing factor models of
individual differences in performance with factor
models of brain functional organization, we demon-
strate that different components of intelligence
have their analogs in distinct brain networks. Using
simulations based on neuroimaging data, we show
that the higher-order factor ‘‘g’’ is accounted for
by cognitive tasks corecruiting multiple networks.
Finally, we confirm the independence of these com-
ponents of intelligence by dissociating them using
questionnaire variables. We propose that intelli-
gence is an emergent property of anatomically
distinct cognitive systems, each of which has its
own capacity.
INTRODUCTION
Few topics in psychology are as old or as controversial as
the study of human intelligence. In 1904, Charles Spearman
famously observed that performance was correlated across
a spectrum of seemingly unrelated tasks (Spearman, 1904).
He proposed that a dominant general factor ‘‘g’’ accounts for
correlations in performance between all cognitive tasks, with
residual differences across tasks reflecting task-specific fac-
tors. More controversially, on the basis of subsequent attempts
to measure ‘‘g’’ using tests that generate an intelligence quotient
(IQ), it has been suggested that population variables including
gender (Irwing and Lynn, 2005; Lynn, 1999), class (Burt, 1959,
1961; McManus, 2004), and race (Rushton and Jensen, 2005)
correlate with ‘‘g’’ and, by extension, with one’s genetically pre-
determined potential. It remains unclear, however, whether
population differences in intelligence test scores are driven by
heritable factors or by other correlated demographic variables
such as socioeconomic status, education level, and motivation
(Gould, 1981; Horn and Cattell, 1966). More relevantly, it is
questionable whether they relate to a unitary intelligence factor,Neas opposed to a bias in testing paradigms toward particular
components of a more complex intelligence construct (Gould,
1981; Horn and Cattell, 1966; Mackintosh, 1998). Indeed, over
the past 100 years, there has been much debate over whether
general intelligence is unitary or composed of multiple factors
(Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1949; Cattell and Horn, 1978; Johnson
and Bouchard, 2005). This debate is driven by the observation
that test measures tend to form distinctive clusters. When
combined with the intractability of developing tests that mea-
sure individual cognitive processes, it is likely that a more
complex set of factors contribute to correlations in performance
(Carroll, 1993).
Defining the biological basis of these factors remains a
challenge, however, due in part to the limitations of behavioral
factor analyses. More specifically, behavioral factor analyses
do not provide an unambiguous model of the underlying cogni-
tive architecture, as the factors themselves are inaccessible,
being measured indirectly by estimating linear components
from correlations between the performance measures of dif-
ferent tests. Thus, for a given set of behavioral correlations, there
are many factor solutions of varying degrees of complexity, all
of which are equally able to account for the data. This ambiguity
is typically resolved by selecting a simple and interpretable
factor solution. However, interpretability does not necessarily
equate to biological reality. Furthermore, the accuracy of any
factor model depends on the collection of a large number of pop-
ulation measures. Consequently, the classical approach to intel-
ligence testing is hampered by the logistical requirements of pen
and paper testing. It would appear, therefore, that the classical
approach to behavioral factor analysis is near the limit of its
resolution.
Neuroimaging has the potential to provide additional con-
straint to behavioral factor models by leveraging the spatial
segregation of functional brain networks. For example, if one
homogeneous system supports all intelligence processes, then
a common network of brain regions should be recruited when-
ever difficulty increases across all cognitive tasks, regardless
of the exact stimulus, response, or cognitive process that is
manipulated. Conversely, if intelligence is supported by multiple
specialized systems, anatomically distinct brain networks
should be recruited when tasks that load on distinct intelligence
factors are undertaken. On the surface, neuroimaging results
accord well with the former account. Thus, a common set of
frontal and parietal brain regions is rendered when peak activa-
tion coordinates from a broad range of tasks that parametrically
modulate difficulty are smoothed and averaged (Duncan and
Owen, 2000). The same set of multiple demand (MD) regions is
activated during tasks that load on ‘‘g’’ (Duncan, 2005; Junguron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1225
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cortex correlates with individuals differences in IQ score (Gray
et al., 2003). Critically, after brain damage, the size of the lesion
within, but not outside of, MD cortex is correlated with the esti-
mated drop in IQ (Woolgar et al., 2010). However, these results
should not necessarily be equated with a proof that intelligence
is unitary. More specifically, if intelligence is formed frommultiple
cognitive systems and one looks for brain responses during
tasks that weigh most heavily on the ‘‘g’’ factor, one will most
likely corecruit all of those functionally distinct systems. Similarly,
by rendering brain activation based on many task demands,
one will have the statistical power to render the networks
that are most commonly recruited, even if they are not always
corecruited. Indeed, there is mounting evidence demonstrating
that different MD regions respond when distinct cognitive
demands are manipulated (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
D’Esposito et al., 1999; Hampshire and Owen, 2006; Hampshire
et al., 2008, 2011; Koechlin et al., 2003; Owen et al., 1996; Pet-
rides, 2005). However, such a vast array of highly specific func-
tional dissociations have been proposed in the neuroimaging
literature as a whole that they often lack credibility, as they fail
to account for the broader involvement of the same brain regions
in other aspects of cognition (Duncan and Owen, 2000; Hamp-
shire et al., 2010). The question remains, therefore, whether intel-
ligence is supported by one or multiple systems, and if the latter
is the case, which cognitive processes those systems can most
broadly be described as supporting. Furthermore, even if
multiple functionally distinct brain networks contribute to intelli-
gence, it is unknown whether the capacities of those networks
are independent or are related to the same set of diffuse biolog-
ical factors that modulate general neural efficiency. It is unclear,
therefore, whether the pattern of individual differences in intelli-
gence reflects the functional organization of the brain.
Here, we address the question of whether human intelligence
is best conceived of as an emergent property of functionally
distinct brain networks using factor analyses of brain imag-
ing, behavioral, and simulated data. First, we break MD cortex
down into its constituent functional networks by factor
analyzing regional activation levels during the performance of
12 challenging cognitive tasks. Then, we build a model, based
on the extent to which the different functional networks are
recruited during the performance of those 12 tasks, and deter-
mine how well that model accounts for cross-task correlations
in performance in a large (n = 44,600) population sample.
Factor solutions, generated from brain imaging and behavioral
data, are compared directly, to answer the question of whether
the same set of cognitive entities is evident in the functional
organization of the brain and in individual differences in perfor-
mance. Simulations, based on the imaging data, are used to
determine the extent to which correlations between first-order
behavioral components are predicted by cognitive tasks re-
cruiting multiple functional brain networks, and the extent to
which those correlations may be accounted for by a spatially
diffuse general factor. Finally, we examine whether the behav-
ioral components of intelligence show a degree of indepen-
dence, as evidenced by dissociable correlations with the types
of questionnaire variable that ‘‘g’’ has historically been associ-
ated with.1226 Neuron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier IncRESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Identifying Functional Networks within MD Cortex
Sixteen healthy young participants undertook the cognitive
battery in the MRI scanner. The cognitive battery consisted of
12 tasks, which, based on well-established paradigms from
the neuropsychology literature, measured a range of the types
of planning, reasoning, attentional, and working memory skills
that are considered akin to general intelligence (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures available online). The activation
level of each voxel within MD cortex was calculated separately
for each task relative to a resting baseline using general linear
modeling (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures) and the
resultant values were averaged across participants to remove
between-subject variability in activation—for example, due to
individual differences in regional signal intensity.
The question of how many functionally distinct networks were
apparent within MD cortex was addressed using exploratory
factor analysis. Voxels within MD cortex (Figure 1A) were
transformed into 12 vectors, one for each task, and these were
examined using principal components analysis (PCA), a factor
analysis technique that extracts orthogonal linear components
from the 12-by-12 matrix of task-task bivariate correlations.
The results revealed two ‘‘significant’’ principal components,
each of which explained more variability in brain activation than
was contributed by any one task. These components accounted
for 90% of the total variance in task-related activation across
MD cortex (Table S1). After orthogonal rotation with the Varimax
algorithm, the strengths of the task-component loadings were
highlyvariableandeasilycomprehensible (Table1andFigure1B).
Specifically, all of the tasks inwhich information had tobeactively
maintained in short-term memory, for example, spatial working
memory, digit span, and visuospatial working memory, loaded
heavily on one component (MDwm). Conversely, all of the tasks
in which information had to be transformed in mind according
to logical rules, for example, deductive reasoning, grammatical
reasoning, spatial rotations, and color-word remapping, loaded
heavily on the other component (MDr). When factor scores
were generated at each voxel using regression and projected
back onto the brain, two clearly defined functional networks
were rendered (Figure 1D). Thus, the insula/frontal operculum
(IFO), the superior frontal sulcus (SFS), and the ventral portion
of the anterior cingulate cortex/ presupplementary motor area
(ACC/preSMA) had greater MDwm component scores, whereas
the inferior frontal sulcus (IFS), inferior parietal cortex (IPC), and
the dorsal portion of the ACC/preSMA had greater MDr compo-
nent scores. When the PCA was rerun with spherical regions of
interest (ROIs) centered on each MD subregion, with radii that
varied from 10 to 25 mm in 5 mm steps and excluding voxels
that were on average deactivated, the task loadings correlated
with those from the MD mask at r > 0.95 for both components
and at all radii. Thus, the PCA solution was robust against varia-
tions in the extent of the ROIs. When data from the whole brain
were analyzed using the same method, three significant compo-
nentswere generated, the first twoofwhich correlatedwith those
from the MD cortex analysis (MDr r = 0.76, MDwm r = 0.83),
demonstrating that these were the most prominent active-state
networks in the brain. The factor solution was also reliable at.
Figure 1. Factor Analyzing Functional Brain
Imaging Data from within Multiple Demand
Cortex
(A) The MD cortex ROIs.
(B) PCA of the average activation patterns within
MD cortex for each task (x axis reports task-
component loading).
(C) PCA with each individual’s data included as
separate columns (error bars report SEM).
(D) Component scores from the analysis of MD
task-related activations averaged across individ-
uals. Voxels that loaded more heavily on the
MDwm component are displayed in red. Voxels
that loaded more heavily on the MDr network are
displayed in blue.
(E) T contrasts of component scores against zero
from the PCA with individual data concatenated
into 12 columns (FDR corrected at p < 0.05 for all
MD voxels).
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individual’s data generated solutionswith two significant compo-
nents in 13/16 cases. There was one three-component solution
and two four-component solutions. Rerunning the two-compo-
nent PCAwith each individual’s data set included as 12 separate
columns (an approach that did not constrain the same task to
load on the same component across participants) demonstrated
that the pattern of task-component loadings was also highly reli-
able at the individual subject level (Figure 1C). In order to test the
reliability of the functional networks across participants, the data
were concatenated instead of averaged into 12 columns (an
approach that does not constrain the same voxels to load on
the same components across individuals), and componentNeuron 76, 1225–1237, Descores were estimated at each voxel and
projected back into two sets of 16 brain
maps. When t contrasts were calculated
against zero at the group level, the same
MDwm and MDr functional networks
were rendered (Figure 1E).
While the PCA works well to identify the
number of significant components, a
potential weakness for this method is
that the unrotated task-component load-
ings are liable to be formed from mixtures
of the underlying factors and are heavily
biased toward the component that is ex-
tracted first. This weakness necessitates
the application of rotation to the task-
component matrix; however, rotation is
not perfect, as it identifies the task-
component loadings that fit an arbitrary
set of criteria designed to generate the
simplest and most interpretable solution.
To deal with this potential issue, the task-
functional network loadings were recalcu-
lated using independent component anal-
ysis (ICA), an analysis technique that
exploits the more powerful properties ofstatistical independence to extract the sources from mixed
signals. Here, we used ICA to extract two spatially distinct func-
tional brain networks using gradient ascent toward maximum
entropy (code adapted fromStone andPorrill, 1999). The resultant
components were broadly similar, although not identical, to those
from the PCA (Table 1). More specifically, all tasks loaded posi-
tively on both independent brain networks but to highly varied
extents, with the short-term memory tasks loading heavily on
one component and the tasks that involved transforming informa-
tion according to logical rules loading heavily on the other. Based
on these results, it is reasonable to conclude that MD cortex is
formed from at least two functional networks, with all 12 cognitive
tasks recruiting both networks but to highly variable extents.cember 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1227
Table 1. PCA and ICA of Activation Levels in 2,275 MD Voxels
during the Performance of 12 Cognitive Tasks
PCA ICA
MDr MDwm MDr MDwm
Self-ordered search 0.38 0.69 1.45 3.26
Visuospatial working
memory
0.27 0.84 1.24 2.68
Spatial span 0.17 0.86 0.51 2.23
Digit span 0.28 0.76 0.76 2.20
Paired associates 0.56 0.62 1.90 1.97
Spatial planning 0.58 0.50 2.43 2.74
Feature match 0.68 0.49 2.00 0.88
Interlocking polygons 0.74 0.31 2.11 0.61
Verbal reasoning 0.78 0.15 2.62 0.60
Spatial rotation 0.75 0.44 2.86 1.88
Color-word remapping 0.69 0.42 3.07 0.95
Deductive reasoning 0.90 0.18 3.98 0.19
PCA/ICA correlation MDr r = 0.92
PCA/ICA correlation MDwm r = 0.81
Table 2. Task-Component Loadings from the PCA of Internet
Data with Orthogonal Rotation
1 (STM) 2 (Reasoning) 3 (Verbal)
Spatial span 0.69 0.22
Visuospatial working memory 0.69 0.21
Self-ordered search 0.62 0.16 0.16
Paired associates 0.58 0.25
Spatial planning 0.41 0.45
Spatial rotation 0.14 0.66
Feature match 0.15 0.57 0.22
Interlocking polygons 0.54 0.3
Deductive reasoning 0.19 0.52 0.14
Digit span 0.26 0.2 0.71
Verbal reasoning 0.33 0.66
Color-word remapping 0.22 0.35 0.51
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of MD Cortex and Individual Differences in Intelligence:
Permutation Modeling
A critical question is whether the loadings of the tasks on the
MDwm andMDr functional brain networks form a good predictor
of the pattern of cross-task correlations in performance
observed in the general population. That is, does the same set
of cognitive entities underlay the large-scale functional organiza-
tion of the brain and individual differences in performance? It is
important to note that factor analyses typically require many
measures. In the case of the spatial factor analyses reported
above, measures were taken from 2,275 spatially distinct ‘‘vox-
els’’ within MD cortex. In the case of the behavioral analyses,
we used scores from 110,000 participants who logged in to
undertake Internet-optimized variants of the same 12 tasks. Of
these,60,000 completed all 12 tasks and a post task question-
naire. After case-wise removal of extreme outliers, null values,
nonsense questionnaire responses, and exclusion of partici-
pants above the age of 70 and below the age of 12, exactly
44,600 data sets, each composed of 12 standardized task
scores, were included in the analysis (see Experimental
Procedures).
The loadings of the tasks on the MDwm and MDr networks
from the ICA were formed into two vectors. These were re-
gressed onto each individual’s set of 12 standardized task
scores with no constant term. When each individual’s MDwm
and MDr beta weights (representing component scores) were
varied in this manner, they centered close to zero, showed no
positive correlation (MDwm mean beta = 0.05 ± 1.78; MDr
mean beta = 0.11 ± 2.92; MDwm-MDr correlation r = 0.20),
and, importantly, accounted for 34.3% of the total variance in
performance scores. For comparison, the first two principal
components of the behavioral data accounted for 36.6% of the
variance. Thus, the model based on the brain imaging data
captured close to the maximum amount of variance that could1228 Neuron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Incbe accounted for by the two best-fitting orthogonal linear
components. The average test-retest reliability of the 12 tasks,
collected in an earlier Internet cohort (Table S2), was 68%.
Consequently, the imaging ICA model predicted >50% of the
reliable variance in performance. The statistical significance of
this fit was tested against 1,000 permutations, in which the
MDwm and MDr vectors were randomly rearranged both within
and across vector prior to regression. The original vectors
formed a better fit than the permuted vectors in 100% of cases,
demonstrating that the brain imaging model was a significant
predictor of the performance data relative to models with the
same fine-grained values and the same level of complexity.
Two further sets of permutation tests were carried out in which
one vector was held constant and the other randomly permuted
1,000 times. When the MDwm vector was permuted, the original
vectors formed a better fit in 100% of cases. When the MDr
vector was permuted, the original vectors formed a better fit in
99.3% of cases. Thus, both the MDwm and the MDr vectors
were significant predictors of individual differences in behavioral
performance.
The Relationship between the Functional Organization
of MD Cortex and Individual Differences in Intelligence:
Similarity of Factor Solutions
Exploratory factor analysis was carried out on the behavioral
data using PCA. There were three significant behavioral compo-
nents that each accounted for more variance than was contrib-
uted by any one test (Table S3) and that together accounted
for 45% of the total variance. After orthogonal rotation with the
Varimax algorithm, the first two components showed a marked
similarity to the loadings of the tasks on the MDwm and MDr
networks (Table 2). Thus, the first component (STM) included
all of the tasks in which information was held actively on line in
short-termmemory, whereas the second component (reasoning)
included all of the tasks in which information was transformed in
mind according to logical rules. Correlation analyses between
the task to functional brain network loadings and the task to
behavioral component loadings confirmed that the two
approaches generated broadly similar solutions (STM-MDwm.
Figure 2. Localizing the Functional-Ana-
tomical Correlates of the Verbal Component
When task-component loadings for the verbal
factor from the behavioral analysis were stan-
dardized and used as a predictor of activation
within the whole brain, a left lateralized network
was rendered, including the left inferior frontal
gyrus, and temporal lobe regions bilaterally
(p < 0.05 FDR corrected for the whole brain mass).
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behavioral component was readily interpretable and easily
comprehensible, accounting for a substantial proportion of the
variance in the three tasks that used verbal stimuli (Table 2),
these being digit span, verbal reasoning, and color-word remap-
ping. A relevant question regards why there was no third network
in the analysis of the MD cortex activation data. One possibility
was that a spatial equivalent of the verbal component did exist
in MD cortex but that it accounted for less variance than was
contributed by any one task in the imaging analysis. Extracting
three-component PCA and ICA solutions from the imaging
data did not generate an equivalent verbal component, a result
that is unsurprising, as a defining characteristic of MD cortex is
its insensitivity to stimulus category (Duncan and Owen, 2000).
A more plausible explanation was that the third behavioral
component had a neural basis in category-sensitive brain
regions outside of MD cortex. In line with this view, the task-
factor loadings from the third behavioral component correlated
closely with those from the additional third component extracted
from the PCA of all active voxels within the brain (r = 0.82,
p < 0.001). In order to identify brain regions that formed a likely
analog of the verbal component, the task-component loadings
were standardized so that they had unit deviation and zero
mean and were used to predict activation unconstrained within
the whole brain mass (see Experimental Procedures). Regions
including the left inferior frontal gyrus and the bilateral temporal
lobes were significantly more active during the performance of
tasks that weighed on the verbal component (Figure 2). This
set of brain regions had little overlap with MD cortex, an obser-
vation that was formalized using t tests on themean beta weights
from within each of the anatomically distinct MD cortex ROIs.
This liberal approach demonstrated that none of the MD ROIs
were significantly more active for tasks that loaded on the verbal
component (p > 0.05, uncorrected and one tailed).
Determining the Likely Neural Basis of Higher-Order
Components
Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that the
behavioral factors that underlie correlations in an individual’sNeuron 76, 1225–1237, Deperformance on tasks of the type typically
considered akin to intelligence have
a basis in the functioning of multiple brain
networks. This observation allows novel
insights to be derived regarding the likely
basis of higher-order components. More
specifically, in classical intelligence
testing, first-order components gener-ated by factor analyzing the correlations between task scores
are invariably correlated positively if allowed to rotate into their
optimal oblique orientations. A common approach is to under-
take a second-order factor analysis of the correlations between
the obliquely orientated first-order components. The resultant
second-order component is often denoted as ‘‘g.’’ This
approach is particularly useful when tasks load heavily on
multiple components, as it can simplify the task to first-order
component weightings, making the factor solution more readily
interpretable. A complication for this approach, however, is
that the underlying source of this second-order component is
ambiguous. More specifically, while correlations between
first-order components from the PCA may arise because the
underlying factors are themselves correlated (for example, if
the capacities of the MDwm and MDr networks were influenced
by some diffuse factor like conductance speed or plasticity),
they will also be correlated if there is ‘‘task mixing,’’ that is,
if tasks tend to weigh on multiple independent factors. In
behavioral factor analysis, these accounts are effectively indis-
tinguishable as the components or latent variables cannot be
measured directly. Here, we have an objective measure of the
extent to which the tasks are mixed, as we know, based on the
functional neuroimaging data, the extent to which the tasks
recruit spatially separated functional networks relative to rest.
Consequently, it is possible to subdivide ‘‘g’’ into the proportion
that is predicted by the mixing of tasks on multiple functional
brain networks and the proportion that may be explained by
other diffuse factors (Figure 3).
Two simulated data sets were generated; one based on the
loadings of the tasks on theMDwm andMDr functional networks
(2F) and the other including task activation levels for the verbal
network (3F). Each of the 44,600 simulated ‘‘individuals’’ was
assigned a set of either two (2F) or three (3F) factor scores using
a random Gaussian generator. Thus, the underlying factor
scores represented normally distributed individual differences
and were assumed to be completely independent in the simula-
tions. The 12 task scores were assigned for each individual
by multiplying the task-functional network loadings from the
ICA of the neuroimaging data by the corresponding, randomlycember 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1229
Figure 3. Determining Whether Cross-component Correlations in the Behavioral Factor Analysis Are Accounted for by the Tasks Recruiting
Multiple Independent Functional Brain Networks
Acognitive taskcanmeasureacombinationof noise, task-specificcomponents,andcomponents thataregeneral, contributing to theperformanceofmultiple tasks.
In the current study, therewere three first-order components: reasoning, short-termmemory (STM), and verbal processing. In classical intelligence testing, the first-
order components are invariably correlated positively when allowed to rotate into oblique orientations. A factor analysis of these correlations may be undertaken to
estimate a second-order component and this is generally denoted as ‘‘g.’’ ‘‘g’’ may be generated from distinct sources: task mixing, the tendency for tasks to
corecruitmultiple systems, anddiffuse factors that contribute to the capacities of all of those systems.Whensimulationswere built based on thebrain imagingdata,
the correlations between the first-order components from the behavioral study were entirely accounted for by tasks corecruiting multiple functional networks.
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scores were then standardized for each task and noise was
added by adding the product of randomly generated Gaussian
noise, the test-retest reliabilities (Table S2), and a noise level
constant. A series of iterative steps were then taken, in which
the noise level constant was adjusted until the summed commu-
nalities from the simulated and behavioral PCA solutions were
closely matched in order to ensure that the same total amount
of variance was explained by the first-order components. This
processwas repeated 20 times to generate a standard deviation.
(Note that matching the total variance explained by the first-
order components in this manner does not bias the result; for
example, if each task loaded on just one first-order component,
then the first-order components would not be correlated.)
The results revealed a significant conformity (Table S4)
between the task-to-component loadings from the PCA models
of simulated data and the Internet behavioral data (simulated to
real correlations: 2F model STM r = 0.56, p < 0.05 and reasoning
r = 0.74, p < 0.005; 3F model STM r = 0.64 p < 0.05, reasoning
r = 0.77, p < 0.005, and verbal r = 0.53, p < 0.05). More impor-
tantly, the size of the correlations between the obliquely oriented
first-order components derived from the PCA of Internet data1230 Neuron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Incand data simulated based on task-functional network activation
levels were almost identical for the 2F model (MDr-MDwm real
r = 0.47, simulated r = 0.46, SD ±0.01) and highly similar for
the 3F model (Figure 3) despite the underlying factors in the
simulated data set being completely independent. Conse-
quently, there was little requirement for a diffuse higher-order
‘‘g’’ factor once the tendency for tasks to corecruit multiple func-
tional brain networks was accounted for.
Dissociating Behavioral Components across Biological
and Demographic Variables
These results suggest that the cognitive systems that underlay
the STM, reasoning, and verbal components should have largely
independent capacities. We sought to confirm this prediction
by examining the correlations between the behavioral compo-
nents (STM, reasoning, and verbal) and questionnaire variables
that have previously been associated with general intelligence.
An in-depth discussion of the relationship between biological
or demographic variables and components of intelligence is
outside the scope of the current article and will be covered
elsewhere. Here, these correlations were used to leverage
dissociations, and the question of whether they are mediated.
Figure 4. The Relationship of Behavioral Components to Age,
Education, and Frequency of Computer Games
The verbal component was less correlated than the STM and reasoning
components with age and frequency with which individuals played computer
games but was more correlated with education level.
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Neby unmeasured biological or demographic variables is not
relevant. The extents to which the questionnaire responses
predicted individual mean and component scores were esti-
mated using generalized linear models. In such a large popula-
tion sample, almost all effects are statistically significant
because uncertainty regarding the proximity of sample means
to population means approaches zero. Consequently, the true
measure of significance is effect size, and here we conformed
to Cohen’s notion (Cohen, 1988) that an effect of 0.2 SD units
represents a small effect,0.5 amedium effect, and0.8 a large
effect. The STM, reasoning, and verbal component scores were
highly dissociable in terms of their correlations with question-
naire variables. Age was by far the most significant predictor of
performance, with the mean scores of individuals in their sixties
1.7 SD below those in their early twenties (Figure 4A). (Note that
in intelligence testing, 1 SD is equivalent to 15 IQ points.) The
verbal component scores showed a relatively late peak and
subtle age-related decline relative to the other two components.
In this respect, the STM and reasoning components can be
considered dissociated from the verbal component in terms of
their sensitivity to aging. Similarly, the mean score and the
STM and reasoning component scores showed small-medium
positive relationships with the frequency with which individuals
played computer games (0.32 SD, 0.2 SD, and 0.3 SD,
respectively) (Figure 4B), whereas the relationship with the verbal
component was negligible. Conversely, while level of education
(calculated from those aged 20+) showed a small-medium-sized
positive relationship with the mean score (0.33) and the verbal
score (0.32 SD), the STM score showed a smaller relationship
(0.23 SD), while the relationship with reasoning (0.12 SD)
was of negligible scale (Figure 4C). The STM and reasoning
components were also dissociated from each other. For
example, individuals who regularly suffer from anxiety (Figure 5A)
had significantly lower mean scores (0.21 SDs), a relationship
that was most pronounced for the STM component (0.35 SDs),
with negligible reasoning (0.06 SDs) and verbal (0.16 SDs)
effect sizes. Similarly, while the differences between male and
female participants’ mean (0.1 SD), verbal (0.03), and reasoning
scores (0.03) were negligible, males showed a small advantage
over females on the STM component score (0.2 SD) (Figure 5B).
Other significant factors included amount smoked (Figure 6A),
with smokers performing worse than nonsmokers on the mean
score (0.19 SD units), a difference that was most pronounced
for the STM component (STM z 0.19 SD, reasoning z 0.09
SD, and verbal z 0.05 SD). By contrast, alcohol consumption
and caffeine intake showed negligible effect sizes for mean
and component scores. Finally, geographical origin (grouped
by country of birth) showed small-medium-sized relationships
with a mean score (0.37 SD) that primarily favored individuals
from countries in which English is the first language (Figure 6B).
The largest relationship between component score and geo-
graphical origin was for the verbal component, which spanned
0.52 SD units, with smaller relationships evident for the
reasoning (0.40 SD) and STM (0.23 SD) scores. (Note that rerun-
ning the behavioral PCA and including only individuals for
whom English was the first language produced the same
three-component solution.) Taken together, this combination of
co-relationship and dissociation of the STM, reasoning, anduron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1231
Figure 5. The Relationship of Behavioral Components to Anxiety
and Gender
The STM component was correlated with self-reported frequency of anxiety
and with gender, whereas the reasoning component was not.
Figure 6. The Relationship of Behavioral Components to Amount
Smoked and Country of Birth
The relationship between amount smoked and performance was of significant
scale for the STM component score. Region of birth was significantly related to
all three component scores, with the greatest correlation being for the verbal
component.
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a basis in relatively independent systems, while demonstrating
how a multifactor model can provide a more informative and
balanced account of population differences in intelligence.
Behavioral Pilot: Comparing the Three Behavioral
Components to the ‘‘g’’ Factor
Data from a pilot study were examined in order to confirm that
the cognitive battery generated scores that correlated with ‘‘g’’
as measured by classic IQ testing. Thirty-five young healthy1232 Neuron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Incright-handed participants undertook the 12 cognitive tasks
under controlled laboratory conditions followed by one of the
most commonly applied classic pen and paper IQ tests—the
Cattell Culture Fair (scale II). Scores were standardized so that
each of the cognitive tasks had zero mean and unit deviation
across participants. For each participant, the standardized
scores were then averaged across the tasks. A significant bivar-
iate correlation was evident between the mean standardized
scores and performance on the Cattell Culture Fair intelligence
test (r = 0.65, p < 0.001). Component scores were calculated
for the 35 pilot participants using regression with the test-
component loadings from the orthogonal PCA of the Internet
cohort’s data. Both the STM and the reasoning component
scores correlated significantly with the Cattell Culture Fair score,
whereas the verbal component showed a positive subthreshold
trend (STM r = 0.52, p < 0.001; reasoning r = 0.34, p < 0.05; verbal.
Neuron
Fractionating Human Intelligencer = 0.26, p = 0.07). Numerically, the strongest correlation was
generated by averaging the STM and reasoning component
scores (STM and reasoning r = 0.65, p < 0.001; STM and verbal
r = 0.54, p < 0.001; verbal and reasoning r = 0.377, p < 0.05).
When second-order component scores were generated for the
pilot participants using the obliquely oriented factor model
from the Internet cohort, they also correlated significantly with
Cattell Culture Fair score (r = 0.64, p < 0.001). These results
suggest that the STM and reasoning components relate more
closely than the verbal component to ‘‘g’’ as defined by classic
IQ testing.
General Discussion
The results presented here provide evidence to support the
view that human intelligence is not unitary but, rather, is formed
from multiple cognitive components. These components reflect
the way in which the brain regions that have previously been
implicated in intelligence are organized into functionally special-
ized networks and, moreover, when the tendency for cognitive
tasks to recruit a combination of these functional networks is
accounted for, there is little evidence for a higher-order intelli-
gence factor. Further evidence for the relative independence
of these componentsmay be drawn from the fact that they corre-
late with questionnaire variables in a dissociable manner. Taken
together, it is reasonable to conclude that human intelligence is
most parsimoniously conceived of as an emergent property of
multiple specialized brain systems, each of which has its own
capacity.
Historically, research into the biological basis of intelligence
has been limited by a circular logic regarding the definition of
what exactly intelligence is. More specifically, general intelli-
gence may sensibly be defined as the factor or factors that
contribute to an individual’s ability to perform across a broad
range of cognitive tasks. In practice, however, intelligence is
typically defined as ‘‘g,’’ which in turn is defined as the measure
taken by classical pen and paper IQ tests such as Raven’s
matrices (Raven, 1938) or the Cattell Culture Fair (Cattell,
1949). If a more diverse set of paradigms are applied and, as
a consequence, a more diverse set of first-order components
are derived, the conventional approach is to run a second-order
factor analysis in order to generate a higher-order component. In
order for the battery to be considered a goodmeasure of general
intelligence, this higher-order component should correlate with
‘‘g’’ as measured by a classical IQ test. The results presented
here suggest that such higher-order constructs should be used
with caution. On the one hand, a higher-order component may
be used to generate a more interpretable first-order factor solu-
tion, for example, when cognitive tasks load heavily on multiple
components. On the other hand, the basis of the higher-order
component is ambiguous andmay be accounted for by cognitive
tasks corecruiting multiple functionally dissociable brain net-
works. Consequently, to interpret a higher-order component as
representing a dominant unitary factor is misleading.
Nonetheless, one potential objection to the results of the
current study could be that while the 12 tasks load on common
behavioral components, by the most commonly applied defini-
tion, these components do not relate to general intelligence
unless they generate a second-order component that correlatesNewith ‘‘g.’’ From this perspective, only the higher-order compo-
nent may truly be considered intelligence, with the first-order
components being task specific. In the current study, this objec-
tion is implausible for several reasons. First, a cognitive factor
that does not relate to such general processes as planning,
reasoning, attention, and short-term memory would, by any
sensible definition, be a very poor candidate for general intelli-
gence. Furthermore, many of the tasks applied here were based
on paradigms that either have been previously associated with
general intelligence or form part of classical intelligence testing
batteries. In line with this view, analysis of data from our pilot
study shows that when a second-order component is generated,
it correlates significantly with ‘‘g,’’ and yet, based on the imaging
data, that higher-order component is greatly reduced, as it may
primarily be accounted for by tasks corecruiting multiple func-
tionally dissociable brain networks. Moreover, MD cortex, which
is both active during and necessary for the performance of
classic intelligence tests, was highly activated during the perfor-
mance of this cognitive battery but was divided into two func-
tional networks. Thus, the tasks applied here both recruited
and functionally fractionated the previously identified neural
correlates of ‘‘g.’’ It should also be noted that this battery of tasks
is, if anything, more diverse than those applied in classical IQ
tests and, in that respect, may be considered at least as able
to capture general components that contribute to a wide range
of tasks. For example, Raven’s matrices (Raven, 1938) employ
variants on one class of abstract reasoning problem, the Cattell
uses just four types of problem, while the WAIS-R (Weschler,
1981) employs 11 subtests. Thus, it is clearly the case that by
either definition, the tasks applied here are related to general
intelligence.
Another potential objection is that the functional brain
networks may not have been defined accurately enough
because they form clearly defined clusters and, therefore, are
negatively correlated across space. Perhaps the ICA underesti-
mated this spatial segregation, causing voxels from one network
to distort the task-component loadings from the other andmask-
ing the contribution of a diffuse higher-order ‘‘g’’ factor. This
objection is highly unlikely for several reasons. First, while ICA
seeks to maximize independence, it does not necessarily derive
completely independent components. For example, in the
current study, theMDwmandMDr components did show the ex-
pected negative correlation across voxels (r = 0.19). Second,
such a close conformity between the second-order correlations
from the simulated and behavioral models would have been
highly unlikely to occur by chance alone if the ICA had failed.
Furthermore, if the networks are spatially separable, then it
should be possible to take relatively unmixed measures of their
task-related activations by examining the centers of each
cluster, where there is minimal network overlap. For example,
when mean task activation levels were extracted from 5 mm
spherical ROIs centered on peak IFO and IFS coordinates within
theMDwmandMDr networks bilaterally, amarked double disso-
ciation was evident across tasks. Specifically, there was either
strong coactivation of regions or strong activation in one region
and virtually no activation in the other dependent on the task
context (Table S5). This is clearly the pattern of results that
would be expected if the ROIs were placed exclusively withinuron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1233
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theless, when the 2F simulations were rerun based on these IFS
and IFO activation levels, the second-order correlation between
the estimated oblique components was not diminished but,
rather, formed a precise match to the Internet behavioral data
(r = 0.47, SD ± 0.02). Thus, while the contribution of diffuse
factors should not be entirely discounted, the results accord
particularly closely with the view that the higher-order ‘‘g’’
component is primarily accounted for by cognitive tasks recruit-
ing multiple functionally dissociable brain networks.
Indeed, from a phenomenological perspective, the idea that
tasks tend to corecruit multiple functional brain networks makes
intuitive sense, as generating a task that depends on any single
cognitive process is likely to be rather intractable. Consider
a simple working memory task, in which the spatial locations
of a sequence of flashes must be observed, maintained, and
repeated (spatial span). Even in this simple context, the partici-
pant must comprehend the written instructions, otherwise,
they may report the correct locations but in the incorrect
sequence. More importantly, people often apply chunking strat-
egies when encoding information in short-term memory in order
to generate a more efficient memory trace. For example, they
may note that the flashes form the outline of a geometric shape.
Such ‘‘chunking’’ strategies are a form of logical transformation
and are known to recruit the IFS (Bor et al., 2001). Thus, even
in the most simple of task contexts, all three of the cognitive
systems identified in the current study would play a role but to
varying extents.
This interplay of processes raises an interesting point
regarding what exactly is meant by the term ‘‘functional net-
work.’’ No doubt, it is the case that the functional networks
identified here often interact closely during the performance of
complex cognitive tasks and, consequently, could be consid-
ered to form specialized subcomponents of a broader cognitive
system. Indeed, from this perspective, the higher-order ‘‘g’’
factor that may be generated from hierarchical analysis of the
behavioral data may be described as representing a higher-
order functional network formed from the corecruitment of the
MDwm and the MDr subnetworks. Such nested architecture is
likely to form an accurate description of the functional organiza-
tion of the brain (Bullmore and Sporns, 2009). Nonetheless,
activity across the MDwm and MDr brain regions was not posi-
tively correlated (Table S5). More importantly, the combination
of corecruitment and strong double dissociation across task
contexts is in close concordance with the proposed criteria for
qualitatively dissociable brain systems (Henson, 2006). Further-
more, the fractionation of MD subregions reported here is highly
replicable and, consequently, is unlikely to be specific to the
choice of tasks. For example, similar functional networks have
recently been reported when spontaneous fluctuations in
resting-state activity are analyzed using ICA and graph theory
(Dosenbach et al., 2008). More importantly, the conformity
between the behavioral and imaging factor solutions supports
the view that they make independent contributions to cognitive
ability. In further support of this view, previous studies have
demonstrated that functional activation within the IFO/preSMA
and IFS/IPC and their associated cognitive processes are dif-
ferentially affected by neurological disorders, pharmacological1234 Neuron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Incinterventions, and genotype (Hampshire and Owen, 2010).
Thus, the MDr and MDwm networks are also dissociable with
respect to their sensitivity to biological factors that modulate
individual differences in cognition.
One of the reviewers of this paper suggested that an additional
‘‘g’’ network might exist within MD but would only be recruited at
the highest levels of demand. Perhaps activation when perform-
ing at lower levels of demand could mask this unitary high-load
network? This interpretation is unlikely, as the tasks were specif-
ically designed to be taxing. More specifically, they used a
combination of speeded/response-driven designs and dynami-
cally adapting difficulty algorithms that kept participants working
at a high cognitive load, yet only 10% of the cross-task variance
within MD cortex remained unexplained by the two-component
model. Moreover, the subdivision ofMD into functionally special-
ized networks accords particularly well with results from pre-
vious studies that have systematically varied difficulty within
task by manipulating specific cognitive demands. For example,
when the number of concurrent rules was manipulated in a chal-
lenging nonverbal reasoning task, there was a disproportionate
increase in the response of the IFS (Hampshire et al., 2011).
Conversely, when the difficulty of a target-distractor decision
was manipulated in a task that required morphed stimuli to be
comparedwithmaintained target objects, therewas a dispropor-
tionate increase in the response of the IFO (Hampshire et al.,
2008). Cross-study comparisons of this type may be more
precisely quantified using factor analysis. When brain maps de-
picting difficulty effects from these previous studies were added
as extra columns in the PCA of task-related activations, the rule
complexity manipulation loaded selectively on the MDr network
(MDr = 0.79, MDwm = 0.06), whereas the object discrimination
manipulation loaded selectively on the MDwm network (MDr =
0.18, MDwm = 0.64). Thus, when specific cognitive demands
are systematically varied, MD cortex fractionates into the same
two functional networks.
This latter analysis highlights a salient issue within the current
literature on frontoparietal function. There are a great many
process-specific models that do not explicitly account for the
broader involvement of MD cortex in cognition. A major chal-
lenge when interpreting this literature is how to group cognitive
processes and functional activations that are reported in isola-
tion into those that are alike, thereby producing a more manage-
able set of cognitive entities. To this end, the STM, reasoning,
and verbal components may provide a sensible starting point,
as they bridge between classical and contemporary models
from the cognitive psychology, intelligence, and neuroimaging
literatures. For example, the association of the STM and
reasoning components with subregions of MD cortex (Duncan
et al., 2000; Woolgar et al., 2010) suggests that they relate
more closely to the general intelligence construct ‘‘g’’ than the
verbal component. Results from the behavioral pilot study
provide tentative evidence for this, as both STM and reasoning
component scores were significantly correlated with IQ, but
the verbal component was not. A stronger confirmation of this
relationship in a larger population sample would form the basis
of a sensible future study. In terms of functional localization,
the observed dissociation between the MDwm and MDr
networks accords closely with the growing evidence for a.
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context of working memory, similar dissociations have been
reported during the maintenance of information in mind versus
the reorganization or transformation of that information (Bor
et al., 2001; Owen et al., 1996; Petrides, 2005). However, in addi-
tion to the ventral activation reported in those studies, the most
superior portion of the IFS ROI was also associated with short-
term memory here, a result that accords particularly well with
results from studies of spatial working memory (Courtney
et al., 1998). More broadly, the MDwm network closely resem-
bles the pattern of activation observed during other simple exec-
utive processes including target detection (Hampshire et al.,
2009), attentional switching (Hampshire and Owen, 2006), and
response inhibition (Aron et al., 2004). On a process level, we
believe that the common requirement in tasks that recruit the
MDwm network is the need to focus on and maintain task-rele-
vant information. Previously, we have suggested that the IFO
uses a relatively simple mechanism to support such processes,
rapidly adapting to represent those items, for example, expected
stimuli and planned responses that form the basis of the task
that the individual is currently focused on (Hampshire et al.,
2010). This representation would form the source of a top-
down signal that biases processing within posterior brain sys-
tems such as category-sensitive visual processing areas
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995). From this perspective, short-
term memory, focused attention, and response control are
facets of the same cognitive system. A testable prediction of
this hypothesis is that simple attentional tasks will not only pref-
erentially recruit the MDwm network, they will also load heavily
on the STM component in terms of performance.
It is particularly interesting that the mental transformation of
spatial, object, and verbal information shares a common
resource within a network of brain regions that includes the
IFS. Previous neuroimaging studies that have focused on varying
demands within any one of these domains accord well with this
finding. For example, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation is
evident during spatial planning (Williams-Gray et al., 2007) and
deductive reasoning (Hampshire et al., 2011). The results here
confirm this relationship in amore direct manner as the planning,
rotations, deductive reasoning, and verbal reasoning tasks all
loaded heavily on the same component in both the behavioral
and the neuroimaging analyses. Thus, on a process level, it
seems sensible to conclude that the MDr network forms
a module that is specialized for the transformation of information
in mind according to logical rules but that is insensitive to the
type or source of information that is transformed. This view is
compatible with the idea that the IFS is recruited during more
complex executive processes (Petrides, 2005) and accords
well with a two-stage model of working memory that assumes
that dorsolateral frontal lobe regions are recruited when informa-
tion is reordered in mind (Owen et al., 1996). A major challenge
for future studies will be to determine the neural mechanism by
which theMDr network supports such diverse logical processes.
The observation of a distinct verbal factor accords particularly
well with Cattell’s hypothesis that intelligence has a distinct
‘‘crystallized’’ component, which is dependent on the skills and
information that an individual acquires with experience (Cattell,
1949; Cattell and Horn, 1978; Vernon, 1964, 1965). More specif-Neically, in the current study, the verbal factor bears many of the
hallmarks of crystalized intelligence, being later to peak and
decline with age and being more correlated with education level
than the STM and reasoning factors. The fact that this compo-
nent is closely related to the verbal domain is a well documented,
but controversial, characteristic of crystalized intelligence and
highlights the ongoing debate over whether it represents the
amount of information a person has absorbed as proposed by
Cattell or the processing of information within the verbal domain
(Cattell, 1943; Vernon, 1964, 1965). With respect to this latter
question, the brain imaging data may offer some clues. The left
inferior frontal gyrus showed increased activation during tests
that loaded heavily on the verbal factor. This region plays
a role in the selection, retrieval, and maintenance of semantic
information (Wagner et al., 2001) and in the production and
comprehension of verbal information (Dronkers et al., 2007;
Just et al., 1996; Rogalsky and Hickok, 2011). Thus, it may be
the case that crystalized intelligence is correlated with both
types of process, as to some extent they share a common
resource within the frontal lobes. Here, the left inferior frontal
gyrus was recruited in conjunction with the posterior temporal
lobes bilaterally. Based on the prior literature, it seems reason-
able to suggest that this network of frontal and temporal brain
regions supports a mechanism that is common to both verbal
and semantic domains, the selective retrieval and maintenance
(Rogalsky and Hickok, 2011) of learnt information. Interestingly,
this same frontal lobe region has recently been implicated in
one of the most abstract forms of human intelligence, analogical
reasoning (Hampshire et al., 2011), in which distal associations
are used to transfer abstract rules between problem contexts
that differ at the concrete level. This most abstract of reasoning
processes was not assessed in the current study, and a testable
prediction is that the ability to cope with increased analogical
demand may be correlated with the verbal component score.
Is it possible that other factors contribute to general task
performance? In our opinion, this is most likely the case, as there
are many functional networks in the brain. For example, the
ability to adapt plans based on rewarding or punishing outcomes
is critical for optimally adaptive behavior and is known to depend
on neural circuitry including the orbitofrontal cortices (Hampshire
andOwen, 2006; Kringelbach, 2005; O’Doherty et al., 2001). This
type of executive process was not directly measured in the
current study. Such processes may be distinct from what we
typically consider to be general intelligence as defined by clas-
sical IQ testing, but they seem sensible inclusions in a multiple
component model of intelligent behavior. Nonetheless, the three
factors identified here reliably explain a large proportion of the
variability in performance on a broad range of the types of task
that would typically be considered akin to general intelligence.
They also functionally fractionate the set of brain regions that
are most commonly recruited across diverse task contexts and
that are most closely associated with ‘‘g.’’ Furthermore, the divi-
sion of tests between the three factors observed here is compre-
hensible from the perspective of influential models from both the
cognitive psychology and functional neuroimaging literatures.
Thus, these results provide strong evidence that human intelli-
gence is a construct that emerges from the functioning of
anatomically dissociable brain networks. When one considersuron 76, 1225–1237, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1235
Neuron
Fractionating Human Intelligencethe high degree of variability in the correlations between the
questionnaire factors that have previously been associated
with ‘‘g’’ and the three component scores measured here, it
seems reasonable to suggest that intelligence is most informa-
tively quantified in terms of not one but multiple distinct abilities.
Future research should focus on whether individual differences
in component score can be related to individual differences in
the function or anatomy of the MDwm, MDr, and verbal
networks, with an emphasis on whether candidate genotypes
mediate such differences, which functional networks and cogni-
tive components are affected by neural assault or cognitive
decline, and the extents to which these components relate
to other popular measures of higher cognitive function includ-
ing inhibitory control, attentional switching, and analogical
reasoning.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
The 12 cognitive tasks are described in detail in the Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures and are available for evaluation at http://www.
cambridgebrainsciences.com. They were designed, based on well-estab-
lished paradigms from the cognitive neuroscience literature, to measure plan-
ning, reasoning, attention, and working memory abilities. In the behavioral
study, the entire battery of tasks took approximately 30 min to complete,
with each task calculating one outcome measure. In the fMRI study, the tasks
were identical to the behavioral versions except that functions for displaying
correct and incorrect feedback were disabled to avoid confounding effects
of variable error processing. The fMRI tasks were run in three 60 s blocks
with 16 s periods of rest, allowing activation during performance of the tasks
to be calculated relative to a resting baseline in the most statistically efficient
manner (Donaldson and Bucknar, 2001). In the imaging study, participants
practiced by undertaking the entire battery of Internet tasks once prior to
entering the scanner. Behavioral data were collected via the Internet between
September and December 2010. The experiment URL was originally adver-
tised in a New Scientist feature (Owen and Highfield, 2010), on the Discovery
Channel web site, in the Daily Telegraph, and on social networking web sites
including Facebook and Twitter. Subsequently, the URL proliferated via blogs
and social networks, with Google finding links to the trial URL on 3,000 web
pages at the time of submission. The 12 tasks were presented in a fixed order
(note, the behavioral components were unrelated to the task order) and on
completion of the trial participants filled out a demographic questionnaire.
Subsequently, they received a report showing their scores relative to the previ-
ously calculated normative data and were directed to a second web site,
where they were informed they could retake the tests and compare scores
with friends on Facebook. Details of the imaging and behavioral analyses
are included in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes five tables and Supplemental Experimental
Procedures and can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.06.022.
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